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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Vicki Carol Slater appeals from the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Law enforcement obtained a search warrant for a residence in Post Falls. (R., p.13.) At
the time officers executed the warrant, Slater (who was not a resident) was present visiting a friend.
(R., pp.13-14.) Officers detained the residence’s occupants, including Slater, while executing the
warrant. (R., p.13.) Another officer ran a drug dog around the vehicles parked in the driveway of
the residence. (R., p.14.) The drug dog alerted on Slater’s vehicle. (R., p.14.) Officers searched
the vehicle and found a baggie of methamphetamine. (R., p.14.) Thereafter, Slater made
incriminating statements to law enforcement regarding the methamphetamine. (R., p.14.)
The state charged Slater with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.37-38.) Slater filed
a motion to suppress, arguing the dog sniff and subsequent search were unlawful because her
vehicle was parked in the driveway of a private residence when law enforcement arrived. (R.,
pp.44-48.) The state opposed the motion. (R., pp.49-52.) The district court held a hearing on the
motion. (See R., pp.54-58; see also Tr., pp.39-85. 1)
Detective Ryan Jacobson testified that he executed the search warrant at the residence,
along with other officers. (Tr., p.46, Ls.14-21.) Slater was present when the officers arrived. (Tr.,
p.46, L.22 – p.47, L.15.) Detective Jacobson notified Slater that she was being detained while
officers executed the warrant. (Tr., p.47, L.18 – p.48, L.1.) Three vehicles, including Slater’s
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For consistency, citations to the transcript will refer to the pagination of the electronic document,
rather than the internal pagination of the transcript. (See Appellant’s brief, p.2, n.1.)
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vehicle, were parked in the driveway of the residence. (Tr., p.48, L.18 – p.49, L.11.) Detective
Jacobson requested consent to search Slater’s vehicle; Slater declined. (Tr., p.50, L.2 – p.51, L.1.)
Deputy Nathan Nelson testified that he and his drug detection canine Pogo were on the
scene to assist with the execution of the search warrant. (Tr., p.63, Ls.14-24.) Deputy Nelson
conducted a dog sniff with Pogo around the three vehicles in the driveway. (Tr., p.64, Ls.3-9.)
Pogo alerted on Slater’s vehicle. (See Tr., p.68, Ls.4-9.)
After taking the matter under advisement, the district court denied Slater’s motion. (R.,
pp.60-66.) The district court found that Slater did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the residence or surrounding area because Slater was neither a resident nor an overnight guest.
(R., pp.64-65.) Further, the district court found that the officers and Pogo were lawfully positioned
in the driveway when the dog sniff occurred. (R., pp.62-64.) “Under the circumstances, it is not
unreasonable to have a drug detection dog conduct a sniff around vehicles parked in a driveway,
before entering the residence, when executing a search warrant.” (R., p.65.) Once Pogo alerted
on the vehicle, probable cause existed to justify the search of the vehicle. (R., p.65.) Therefore,
the district court denied Slater’s motion to suppress. (R., p.66.)
Thereafter, Slater entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine.
(See Tr., p.94, Ls.10-14; p.95, L.17 – p.96, L.12.) The district court withheld judgment and placed
Slater on probation for two years. (R., pp.102-04; Tr., p.116, Ls.4-7.) Slater filed a timely notice
of appeal. (R., pp.113-15, 123-26.)

2

ISSUE
Slater states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Slater’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Slater failed to show that the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Slater Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied Her Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
“Mindful” that a dog sniff is not a search and that an individual cannot demonstrate

standing solely by being a visitor at another’s residence, Slater argues that the district court erred
when it denied her motion to suppress because the dog sniff of her vehicle was unlawful. 2
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) and Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405 (2005)).) Slater has failed to demonstrate a violation of her Fourth Amendment
rights. First, the dog sniff did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Second, Slater did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from her vehicle parked in the
driveway of a friend’s residence. Third, the officer conducting the dog sniff was lawfully present
in the driveway, executing a search warrant of the residence. Therefore, the district court did not
err when it denied Slater’s motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion

to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles
to those facts. State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). “At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
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Slater does not dispute that the search of her vehicle was supported by probable cause based on
the drug dog’s alert, but challenges only the constitutionality of the dog sniff.
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weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Pieper, 163 Idaho
732, 734, 418 P.3d 1241, 1243 (Ct. App. 2018).
C.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Slater’s Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and

seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[A] defendant bringing a motion to suppress must show that
there was a Fourth Amendment search, that he has standing to challenge the search, and that the
search was unreasonable.” State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 905, 454 P.3d 543, 547 (2019). Slater
has failed to make such a showing.
First, Slater does not challenge a Fourth Amendment search or seizure. “A dog sniff along
the outside of a motor vehicle does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.” State
v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)); see
also -Caballes,
- --- - - - - 543 U.S. at 409. When a reliable drug dog indicates
that a vehicle contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe
there are drugs in the vehicle and search it without a warrant. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703,
706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012); State v. Cox, 166 Idaho 894, ___, 465 P.3d 1133, 1137 (Ct. App.
2020).
Slater challenges only the dog sniff of her vehicle. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7 (“[T]he
officer unlawfully ran the drug dog around her car.”).) She does not dispute that the dog alert
provided sufficient probable cause to support the search of her vehicle, nor does she argue that the
dog sniff occurred during an unlawful detention or unlawfully prolonged an otherwise lawful
detention. However, a dog sniff does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Because Slater
is not challenging a Fourth Amendment search or seizure, she has failed to raise a cognizable
Fourth Amendment claim.
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Second, Slater does not have standing. “Standing in the Fourth Amendment context is used
as shorthand for the question of whether the defendant personally has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the place searched.” Maxim, 165 Idaho at 906, 454 P.3d at 548 (emphasis in original).
“[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, one who has no ownership or possessory interest and is not
a resident but who is merely paying a brief, casual visit, has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in a residence.” State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131, 922 P.2d 426, 428 (Ct. App. 1996); see
also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142-46.
Slater was merely a casual visitor at her friend’s residence and did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her friend’s property, including the driveway. (R., pp.14, 61.) Slater
does not challenge the district court’s finding that she had no reasonable expectations of privacy
which were violated. (See Appellant’s brief, p.6 (citing R., pp.64-65).) Accordingly, Slater has
no standing to challenge the validity of the dog sniff. See Vasquez, 129 Idaho at 131, 922 P.2d at
428 (“His status as a casual visitor did not accord him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
apartment. Therefore, the entry by the Nampa police, even if not constitutionally justified, did not
violate Vasquez’s Fourth Amendment rights.”).
Last, even if the dog sniff itself implicated Slater’s own Fourth Amendment rights, she has
failed to show that it was unreasonable. Law enforcement officers are allowed to be in places open
to the public, including direct access routes to private property. See State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho
112, 115, 175 P.3d 801, 804 (Ct. App. 2007). “Direct access routes to the house, including
driveways, parking areas, and pathways to the entry, are areas to which the public is impliedly
invited.” Id. Officers that come onto private property for some legitimate purpose and restrict
their activities to such areas where ordinary visitors could be expected to go are permitted the same
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intrusion as would be expected of a citizen and observations from such vantage points are lawful.
Id.
Deputy Nelson conducted the dog sniff of the vehicle in the driveway of the residence—a
direct access route to which the public, including law enforcement, is impliedly invited. (Tr., p.64,
Ls.3-9.) Further, the officers were executing a valid search warrant for the residence, and therefore
had authority to intrude onto the private residence beyond its public access routes to search for and
seize evidence, including drugs and drug paraphernalia. (See R., pp.60-61.) Because the valid
search warrant specifically authorizes law enforcement to search for evidence of drug activity,
conducting dog sniffs around the vehicles located on the property was reasonable. The district
court did not err when it denied Slater’s motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 15th day of March, 2021.

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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